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How Not to File a Complaint
By Douglas E. Abrams
 A few years ago,  H.  Michael 
Stanard and his company, One Zero 
Charlie Productions, built an outdoor 
amphitheater on his property in rural 
Illinois and began hosting public events 
there. But all was not clear sailing. 
Stanard alleged that the county sheriff 
forced him to provide security at these 
events by hiring off-duty deputies at 
inflated wages, and threatened to close 
the road leading to the amphitheater if 
he refused to make these hires.1  
 Stanard’s allegations raised the 
specter of serious official misconduct, 
but the property owner never got his 
day in court. After more than a year 
of skirmishing and false starts, the 
federal district judge dismissed the 
case with prejudice because Stanard’s 
lawyer, Walter P. Maksym of Chicago, 
failed three times to draft a complaint 
minimally passable under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 The 7th Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
order because the second amended 
complaint remained “far outside the 
bounds of acceptable legal writing.”2 
“Each iteration of the complaint was 
generally incomprehensible and riddled 
with errors, making it impossible for the 
defendants to know what wrongs they 
were accused of committing.”3
     
Simplicity and Standards
 The Stanard fiasco’s common sense 
lesson is that, despite the Federal 
Rules’ accent on notice pleading 
rather than the hyper-technicality that 
plagued earlier common law and code 
pleading, the Rules demand competent, 
meticulous writing from counsel.4 The 
pleadings must contain “a short and 
plain statement” of the claim and any 
defenses, as the case may be.5 “Each 
allegation must be simple, concise, and 
direct.”6 Because the Rules “should 
be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and 
proceeding,”7 these commands have 
teeth.    
 Under Rule 15, “[t]he court should 
freely give leave [to amend a pleading] 
when justice so requires.”8  The Supreme 
Court has held, however, that district 
courts retain “broad discretion to 
deny leave to amend where there is 
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies, 
undue prejudice to the defendants, or 
where amendment would be futile.”9 
In Stanard, the district court finally lost 
patience with lawyer Maksym, who 
ran afoul of each of these criteria by 
“prov[ing] unable to file an intelligible” 
complaint after three tries, the initial 
complaint and two amendments.10
 Wherever possible, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure favor judgments on the 
merits, and not on procedural infirmity.11 
The overarching contemporary vision 
perceives procedure as the means for 
securing judicial resolution under the 
substantive law, and not as an end in 
itself.   Writing that is less than stellar 
normally does not produce dismissal 
with prejudice, but (as plaintiff Stanard 
learned the hard way) sometimes the 
lawyer’s performance falls persistently 
below a minimal threshold of competence 
that courts are willing to accept.       
“Incomprehensible and 
Riddled With Errors”
 Michael Stanard’s original 52-page 
multi-count complaint contained “a 
number of obviously frivolous claims,” 
and failed to specify which of more 
than two dozen defendants were liable 
under each of the other claims.12  Lawyer 
Maksym ignored court orders to respond 
to defense motions, missed several 
deadlines, sometimes sought extensions 
of time, and sometimes filed responses 
barely minutes before the court’s 
deadline would expire. When the lawyer 
finally filed the first amended complaint, 
his effort was “haphazard at best” and 
still marked by “basic incoherence.”13 
 Lawyer Maksym reached the end 
of the road, however, for reasons that 
transcended recalcitrance and legal 
insufficiency.  When it affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal with prejudice 
of the second amended complaint, the 
7th Circuit stressed that “unintelligibility 
is certainly a legitimate reason” for 
denying leave to amend a pleading.14 
Writing for the panel, Judge Diane Sykes 
catalogued five failures that marked 
Maksym’s latest submission:
 
	 Lack of punctuation (“At least 
23 sentences contained 100 or 
more words.”)  Judge Sykes drew 
particular attention to a “staggering 
and incomprehensible” 345-word 
sentence that consumed more than 
30 lines in the Federal Reporter;15  
	 Near incomprehensibility (“Much 
of the writing is little more than 
gibberish.”); 
	 Failure to follow basic directions 
(“Given three attempts to file a 
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proper complaint, Maksym could 
not even bring himself to correct the 
errors catalogued by the district court 
following the first two rejections.”); 
	 Failure to put defendants on notice 
(“Despite the complaint’s length – 
or perhaps in part because of it – it 
remains unclear what constitutes the 
core of the claims against Nygren 
and the other defendants.”); and 
	 Grammatical and syntactical errors 
(“The district court put it best: ‘The 
grammatical and spelling errors’ are 
‘too numerous to add “[sic]” where 
required.’”).16  
 To make matters worse for lawyer 
Maksym, when he sought to salvage his 
client’s case and his own professional 
reputation on appeal, the 7th Circuit 
found his appellate brief “woefully 
deficient”17 and marked by “[a]ll the 
deficiencies that plagued the various 
versions of the complaint.”18 By that 
time, the journey from law office to the 
clerk’s office had already left the road 
strewn with casualties, including the 
lawyer himself.  
 Plaintiff Stanard lost his opportunity 
for judicial resolution after months 
of procedural skirmishing that likely 
saddled him with hefty attorneys’ fees, 
but with little remaining opportunity 
for relief except a potential malpractice 
action against his lawyer.  A malpractice 
action would start the expensive and 
emotionally draining litigation roller 
coaster anew, a prospect that clients do 
not anticipate when they retain counsel 
to secure relief in federal court. 
 Lawyer Maksym did not emerge 
unscathed, either.  He told the Chicago 
Tribune that he was struggling with 
serious health issues while representing 
Mr. Stanard,19 but the 7th Circuit 
panel concluded that the lawyer’s 
performance in the case raised “serious 
questions about his competence to 
practice before” the court.  The panel 
ordered him to show cause why he 
should not be suspended from the court’s 
bar or otherwise disciplined under Rule 
46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.20  The panel also directed 
the clerk to send a copy of its opinion 
to Illinois bar authorities for possible 
disciplinary action.21
 
Conclusion: A Lawyer’s 
Principal Asset
 In most years when I taught civil 
procedure, I would incorporate a 
practical drafting component into 
doctrinal instruction, lest the students 
leave the course lulled into complacency 
that the Federal Rules’ accent on notice 
pleading somehow relaxes standards for 
competent research and writing.22  The 
practical lesson was that although Rule 
8(e) instructs courts that “[p]leadings 
must be construed so as to do justice,”23 
generous construction has its limits.
 Cases such as Stanard remain extreme 
for both the magnitude of the lawyer’s 
failures and the force of the court’s 
public reaction, but extreme cases 
sometimes elicit valuable universal 
lessons.  Regardless of any details that 
might emerge about lawyer Maksym’s 
health issues, the overarching lesson here 
transcends this particular case.  Shoddy 
pre-trial writing can compromise a 
lawyer’s reputation because trial and 
appellate courts alike sometimes go 
public with their criticism.  
 The court may identify the offending 
lawyer by name in its opinion or order, 
as the court did 55 times in Stanard. 
In another recent decision, Nault v. 
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
Foundation,24 the federal district judge’s 
order twice identified the plaintiff’s 
lawyer by name for filing motion papers 
that were “riddled with unprofessional 
grammatical and typographical errors 
that nearly render the entire Motion 
incomprehensible.”25  The Nault judge 
even ordered that the lawyer personally 
hand deliver to his client a copy of the 
order and the court’s mark-up of the 
motion papers, showing the errors.26
 Even where the lawyer goes unnamed 
in the court’s opinion or order, readers 
can easily determine his or her identity 
by glancing at the list of appearances 
that follow the case’s caption.  In 
Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch 
Independent School District,27 for 
example, the opinion of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit left the lawyer 
unnamed, but also left no doubt about 
the panel’s condemnation:  “Usually 
we do not comment on technical and 
grammatical errors, because anyone can 
make such an occasional mistake, but 
here the miscues are so egregious and 
obvious that an average fourth grader 
would have avoided most of them.”28 
 Whether or not the court identifies 
the lawyer by name, the damage is 
done because word gets around.  In 
cities, suburbs and outstate areas alike, 
the practicing bar usually reduces itself 
to a relatively discrete group bound 
by bar association memberships, other 
mutual relationships, word of mouth, 
recollections, and past experiences. The 
specialization that characterizes much of 
contemporary law practice may constrict 
the circle still further. 
 A court’s public criticism becomes 
a permanent mark readily available to 
other lawyers who follow the advance 
sheets or the professional and popular 
media. Westlaw, Lexis and other 
electronic research sources transmit the 
mark even wider. 
 At stake is personal reputation, which 
Judge Hugh R. Jones of the New York 
Court of Appeals appropriately called 
“a lawyer’s . . . principal asset.”29   A 
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lawyer’s reputation, wrote Chief Judge 
Benjamin N. Cardozo when he sat on 
that court decades earlier, “is a plant of 
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, 
is not easily restored.”30     
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